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20 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

raised the question as to whether the extension of the common law
rule so as to allow a plaintiff to demand a bill of particulars before
replication filed, and which extension was incorporated in sec. 102,
Pr. Act, 1903, was repealed by sec. 34 of the Pr. Act, 1912. The
Supreme Court held that Rule 18, appended to the statute of 1912,
expressly reserved the practice as it had existed before the repeal,
even though the Act of 1903 was in fact repealed.
In conclusion, it may be said:
1. -That, with the exception of the extension of the common
lav as contained in the Revision of 1877,13 all the statutory enactments have been declaratory of the common law.
2. That the net result of the Supreme Court rules and various
provisions of the practice acts, which rules and provisions were
designed to clarify the law, has been to present numerous problems
of statutory construction, where the common law otherwise was
clear and definite.
3. That the situation in New Jersey could be clarified by a
repeal of Rule 18, Pr. Act, 1912, known as Supreme Court Rule
32, and the re-enactment of the extension contained in the Revision
of 1877. This would leave the use of the bill of particulars to be
determined according to the rules of the common law, subject to
the single, simple modification, in favor of a plaintiff who demands
a bill .before filing his replication.
4. That to all intents and purposes Supreme Court Rule 32,
providing that "Bills of particulars may be ordered as heretofore,"
means that they may be ordered as at common law, subject to the
single exception noted above, and hence it follows that the court
properly granted the motion to vacate the order allowing the defendant a more specific bill of particulars. It should be noted at
this point that the legislation concerning bills of particulars, herein
discussed, referred only to cases on contracts. But as bills of particulars in tort cases were allowed at common law, it is submitted
that under a proper construction of the phrase "as heretofore" contained in Supreme Court Rule 32, they may be granted on proper
application.14
ALISON REPPY.
PROCESS-IMMUNITY OF NoN-RESIDENT DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL CASES FROM SERVICE OF CIVIL PRoCESs.- [Connecticut] A

resident of New Jersey, arrested in Connecticut on a misdemeanor
charge, gave bail for his appearance, and went back to his home
state. He returned to Connecticut to attend his trial, and, while the
13. Ibid.

14. See Watkins v. Cope 84 N. J. L. 143, at 147, where the court declared: "It is true that Sec. 102 of the Practice act of 1903 provides only
for a demand of particulars in contract cases; but I do not understand that
this in any way abrogated the common law practice of directing a bill of
particulars to be furnished by either party in a proper case, whether of contract or of tort. Sec. 102 was repealed by the act of 1912, but rule 18
appended to the latter act says that 'bills of particulars may be ordered as
heretofore.' The rule at common law was well settled that in a proper case
particulars would be ordered in all classes of legal actions."
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same was in progress, was served with a summons in a civil action.
His plea in abatement, in the latter case, setting up the foregoing facts, was sustained by the trial court, and the action dismissed. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Errors reversed the
judgment abating the action on the ground that a defendant in a
criminal case under these conditions had no immunity from service
of civil process.1
Few questions have produced so much conflict of opinion as
the immunity of non-residents from service of civil process while
attending judicial proceedings in various capacities.
The English cases are quite clear on the point that both witnesses and parties in civil cases were privileged from arrest on civil
process while going to the trial, attending and returning without
unreasonable delay.2 The basis of the privilege seems to have been
primarily to prevent the delay or interruption of the case on trial.
In a case where a non-resident witness had come from France
and had been arrested on civil process while awaiting the trial, his
discharge was ordered without filing common bail. 3
"Although a party may have the benefit of the evidence of a witness
who has been arrested, by means of a habeas corpus ad testificandum,
yet, in order to encourage witnesses to come forward voluntarily, they
are privileged from arrest. ' 4
The service of a summons on either a witness or a party to a
civil case while attending the trial might be a contempt of court, 5
but that fact apparently did not furnish a resident witness or party
any ground for vacating the service. 6 A defendant in a criminal
case, who had been arrested on criminal process and detained in
custody, had no privilege from arrest on civil process immediately
after acquittal and before he could leave 7the place of trial, even
where the. service amounted to a contempt.
But a defendant in a criminal case who had given bail was
privileged from arrest on civil process while returning immediately
after a continuance of the case."
1. Ryan v. Ebecke (Conn. 1925) 128 Atl. 14.
2. Walpole v. Alexander (1782) 3 Doug. 45; Spence v. Bart (1802)
3 East 89.
3. The discharge without common bail apparently operated as a complete discharge from appearance: Per curium in Sanford v. Chase (1824)
3 Cowen 381: "The only question is, whether the defendant is to be discharged on filing common bail, or absolutely from the suit. In Norris v.
Beach (2 John. Rep. 294) this court discharged the defendant from the arrest,
entirely and absolutely. In a subsequent case (Bours v. Tuckerman 6 John.
538), he was discharged on filing common bail. We adopt the first case. The

privilege of a witness should be absolute. 'An arrest should not be valid
even for the purpose of giving jurisdiction to the court out of which the
process issues; more especially where the witness is attending from a
foreign state."
4. Walpole v. Alexander supra.

5. Cole v. Hawkins (1729) 2 Strange 1094.
6. Poole v. Gould (1856) 1 H. & N. 99.
7. Goodzvin v. Lordon (1834) 1 Ad. & E. 376; Hare v. Hyde (1851)
16 Q. B. (x. s.) 394.
& Gilpin v. Cohen (1869) L. R. 4 Exch. Cas. 131.
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The English courts do not appear to have made any distinction
between resident parties and witnesses in civil cases. Both had the
same privilege from arrest on civil process, and neither seem to
have been privileged from summons. The defendant in a criminal
case who had given bail seems to have had the same privilege as a
party to a civil case. The non-resident witness was more favored,
though whether his privilege extended to mere summons is left in
doubt.
In the United States the courts generally agree that a nonresident witness is privileged from service of summonsP as well as
from arrest on civil process while attending judicial proceedings in
which his testimony is needed. The policy of the rule is clear.
Litigants frequently need the testimony of non-resident witnesses
who will not come, if by so doing they may be subjected to the disadvantages and burdens of litigation in another state.
In the case of non-resident parties to civil cases there is more
difference of opinion.
A few states refuse to recognize any privilege in favor of nonresident plaintiffs, 0 on the ground that a non-resident plaintiff comes
into the state voluntarily to invoke the aid of its courts for his own
benefit, and therefore is in no position to object when the power of
such courts is invoked against him by a resident plaintiff. This
view is more plausible than sound where a privilege is recognized
-in favor of a non-resident defendant.
The non-resident defendant, who has been sued and properly
served in a case where there is no privilege returns to defend it
voluntarily, in the sense that he is under no legal compulsion. There
is no process by which he can be brought back. He returns because
the protection of his interests requires his personal attendance at
the trial.
The non-resident plaintiff comes into the state for a similar
reason. He must sue his debtor where he can find him, and his
personal presence as a witness or otherwise is necessary to the proper
prosecution of his suit.
Accordingly, it is held by a majority of the courts, that a nonresident plaintiff" is entitled to the same protection as the nonresident defendant. Nearly all of the courts are in accord that 1a2
non-resident defendant is privileged from service of civil process.
9. Person v. Grier (1876) 66 N. Y. 124; Chittenden v. Carter (1909)
82 Conn. 585; Kaufman v. Kennedy (1885) 25 Fed. 786; Dw-ofl v. A!lcn
(1912) 193 Fed. 546; Slcerman v- Gundlach, (1887) 37 Minn. 118; Ben45 V.
Humphrey (1915) 214 N. Y. 21; Bolgiwo v. Gilbert (1890) 73 Md. 132.
10. Bishop v. Vose (1858) 27 Conn. 1; Baldwin v. Emerson (1888)
16 R. I. 304; Baisley v. Baisley (1892) 113 Mo. 544.
11. In re Healey (1881) 53 Vt. 694; Matthews v. Tufts (1882) 87 N. Y.
568; Diamond v. Earle (1914) 217 Mass. 499; Stewart v. Ramsay (1916) 242
U. S. 128; Page Co. v. Macdonald (1923) 261 U. S. 446.

12. Halsey v. Stewart (1817) 4 N. J. L. 426; Wilson Machine Co. v.
Wilson (1884) 61 Conn. 595;Palmer v. Rowan (1887) 21 Neb. 462; First
Nat'l. Bank v. Ames (1888) 39 Minn. 179; Lon.q v. Hawken (1911) 114 Md.
234, 42 L. P, A. (x. s.) 1101, annotated, in which a number of the cases
are collected.
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The basis of the privilege in favor of both plaintiffs and defendants is mainly a notion of fairness, that non-residents should be
able to enforce their own claims or defend those made against them
without being subjected to the danger and hazards of fresh litiga-

tion in a foreign jurisdiction.
The privilege of parties to civil cases, while not necessarily
decisive on the question of the privilege of a non-resident defendant
in a criminal case, may throw some light on its proper solution.
Claims of privilege in favor of non-resident defendants in criminal cases fall into four groups.
1. Where the defendant has been arrested in the state where
the alleged offense was committed, and is there served with civil
process while in custody, or immediately after his discharge and
before he could depart.
In such cases the privilege is generally denied.11
The reasons for the contrary view1 ' are sentimental rather than
substantial. The ground assigned is the hardship on the defendant to
be distracted with civil matters when he is occupied with his defense
to a criminal charge.
2. Where the defendant has been brought back by extradition
proceedings, and is served with civil process while in custody or
immediately after his discharge.
In this situation a few courts allow the claim of privilege from
service of civil process.15 The basis of these rulings is not so much
to favor the defendant as to prevent the abuse of extradition, and
to prevent refusals to honor a demand for extradition because of
the possibility of its fraudulent use to obtain civil jurisdiction. As
the abuse of criminal process to bring the party within reach of
civil process is everywhere recognized as a ground for setting aside
the service thus obtained,"' it would seem that there is an adequate
safeguard against fraudulent extradition.
.Accordingly, a majority of the courts deny any1 7privilege to the
defendant in custody under extradition proceedings.
3. Where the non-resident defendant voluntarily returns to
give bail or stand trial on a criminal charge, and is served with civil
process.
Here it seems clear that the defendant ought to have the same
privilege as a defendant in a civil case. It is true that if he did not
return he might be extradited. But sound policy would seem to
13. Nettograph Mfg. Co. v. Scrugham (1910) 197 N. Y. 377.

14. Fei.ste v. Hulic (1916) 228 Fed. 821; Silvey v. Koppell (1917) 107
S. C. 106.
15. Campton v. Weilder (1883) 40 6hlo St 130; Moletor v. Sinnen
(1890) 76 Wis. 308; Weale v. The Judge (1909) 158 Mich. 563. In these
cases the defendant was arrested on civil process immediately after discharge.
The reason of the rule would seem to apply equally to service of a summons.
16. Byle v. Jones (1883) 79 Mo. 261; Willard v. Zehr (1905) 215 Ill.

148; Smith v. Canal Zone (1917) 249 Fed. 273..
17.' Williams ,v. Bacon (1834) 10 Wendel 636; Reid v. Ham (1893) 54
Minn. 305; In re Walker (1901) 61 Neb. 803; Willard v. Zehr (190 ). 215
I1. 148; Rutledge v. Drau (1906) 73 N. J. L; 397.
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favor the encouragement of voluntary returns so as. to avoid the
delay and expense of extradition.
"If the appellant had appeared voluntarily in a civil action, it is
conceded that he would be entitled to the privilege. We are unable to
perceive any reason for according the immunity to a civil litigant
while denying it to one who comes to defend himself against a charge
of crime. Unless he was before the court the criminal action could
not proceed. By coming voluntarily the defendant removes an obstacle
to the administration of justice, and saves the expense and trouble of
extradition. Is it not in the interest of a sound public policy that this
should be encouraged?" '

4. Where, as in the principal case, a non-resident defendant
has given bail and returns to stand trial.
Here sound policy is in favor of the privilege.' 9
The defendant at large on bail is in fact free to return or not
as he may see fit.
If he does not return the criminal case cannot proceed in his
absence. He will, of course, forfeit his bond, and his bondsmen may
surrender him, or the state might extradite him. But it is readily
conceivable that a defendant who has given a small bail bond to
answer a misdemeanor charge might prefer to forfeit the bond and
take the chance of possible extradition, rather than subject himself
to serious and expensive civil litigation away from his home state.
The main difference between his position and that of a defendant in a civil case is the possibility of extradition. His position is
radically different from the defendant in actual custody who has no
choice but to remain. In allowing privilege from arrest on civil
process to a defendant who had given bail for his appearance in a
criminal case, Baron Cleasby pointed out the practical difference
between a defendant in custody and a defendant on bail:
"Now, there is an obvious distinction between the case of a person
apprehended under a charge of felony, and tried, and then discharged,
and the case of one who, being under recognizances to be tried, goes
up to take his trial in pursuance of those recognizances, and where,
it is a matter of his own will and action whether he will go
therefore,
20
or

n1ot."

The same distinction was pointed out in Michaelson v. Goldfarb, supra, as the reason for allowing the privilege, to encourage
the defendant to return to meet the criminal charge and thus avoid
the expense and delay of extradition. If fairness to a defendant in
a civil case calls for a privilege, why should a non-resident in a
criminal case be put in a worse position merely because the state
may be able at some future time to enforce his presence?
18. Church v. Church (1921) 270 Fed. 361. '
19. Martin v. Bacon. (1905) 76 Ark. 158: Murray v. Wilcox (1904) 122
Ta. 188: Kaufinan v. Garner (1909) 173 Fed. 550; Michaelson v. Goldfarb
(1920) 94 N. J. L. 352; Prescott v. Prescott (N. J. Ch. 1923) 122 AtI. 611.
20. Gilpin v. Cohen (1860) L R. 4 Exch. 131.
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The contrary view in the principal case seems to be based on a
recent case 2' in New York, in which the matter is disposed of on the
following reasoning:
A non-resident defendant in custody under criminal process has
no privilege because not within the reason of the rule allowing privilege to parties in civil cases. A defendant- admitted to bail in a
criminal case is in constructive custody. Hence such a defendant is
not entitled to privilege. This extremely technical reasoning makes
fictions take the place of facts, and loses sight of the policy on which
the privilege is based in other cases.

E, W. HINTON.
21. Nettograph Mfg. Co. v. Scrugham (1910) 197 N. Y. 377.
same affect, Ex parte Henderson (1914) 27 N. D. 155.
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